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I
INTRODUCTION:

THE CONSTITUTION

OF JAPAN AND

POLITICAL FREEDOM

The Constitution ofJapan proclaims in its preamble that "sovereign power
resides with the people," demanding that governmental affairs be executed in
accordance with the people's will. Article 15 of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to
dismiss them," and Article 16 states that "[e]very person shall have the right
of peaceful petition." Needless to say, for governmental affairs to be done in
accordance with the people's will, the people need to be informed enough to
be able to form their own opinions and to be given opportunities to express
and exchange those opinions. Therefore, in Article 21, the Constitution
guarantees "[f]reedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press
and all other forms of expression," including political freedom.
The constitutional guarantee of political freedom means that the people
have the right to participate in the governmental process and the right to
engage freely, whether directly or indirectly, in political campaigns and
activities. The constitutional guarantee of political freedom not only provides
to the people the right to participate in the political process in a narrow sense,
such as by becoming a member of the Diet or a local assembly, engaging in
election campaigns, organizing or affiliating with political groups, and making
petitions, but it also provides for broader freedoms, such as expressing
political views through speech, the press, assembly, demonstration, and all
other forms. In this respect, political freedom has a social character that
functions outwardly. Political freedom does not reside in one's mind, and it
often has outward manifestations that conflict with other individuals' rights
and social interests. Thus, political freedom is not unlimited. If there is any
conflicting compelling interest, we have to accept certain restrictions upon
political freedom. Nevertheless, political freedom is essential to a democratic
government. Therefore, any restriction upon that freedom requires
deliberate consideration of whether the restriction is constitutional.
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In that regard, Article 13 of the Constitution states that constitutional
rights shall "be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other
governmental affairs." Thus, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be easily restricted, even by statute. Political freedom justifies the
exercise of governmental power in a democratic state, so it is deemed to be
the most fundamental right. In other words, this freedom is a crucial right
that underlies democracy and therefore occupies the preferred position
among other constitutional rights and freedoms. In this respect, it is different
from any other right. Thus, when political freedom is to be restricted for
some reason, the restrictive measure is subject to strict scrutiny of its
constitutionality.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the current restrictions on
political campaigns and activities in Japan from the basic point of view just
described. Despite constitutional protection, the present condition of
political freedom in Japan contains many problems and needs improvement.
II
RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN JAPAN

A.

Restrictions on Political Activities by Public Employees

1. The Structure of Existing Laws. Public employees are those people who
perform the public services of national or local public entities. In terms of
freedom of political activities, public employees are subject to extensive
restrictions under the National Public Employees Law ("NPEL")' and the
2
Local Public Employees Law ("LPEL").
Article 102, paragraph 1, of the NPEL provides that:
Personnel shall neither solicit nor receive donations or other benefits for a political
party or for a political purpose, nor shall they in any manner have a part in such acts;
and apart from exercising their right to vote, they must not engage in political acts, as
prescribed by the Rules of the National Personnel Authority.

Article 110, paragraph 1, number 19, provides that any person who violates
the restrictions placed on political acts shall be sentenced to penal servitude
not exceeding three years or fined an amount not exceeding one hundred
thousand yen. Rule 14-7 of the National Personnel Authority ("NPA")
prohibits seventeen "political acts" done for "political purposes," such as
giving support to or making objections against a specific candidate for public
office, a specific political party, a specific cabinet, or a specific policy of the
3
government.
Rule 14-7 lists a wide range of "political acts. ' 4 It includes not only abuse
of authority or position, bribery, and the establishment of a political party or
group, but it also lists publishing, editing, or circulating newspapers and
magazines of a political party or group, or assisting therein; planning, leading,
1.
2.
3.
4.

National Public Employees Law, Law No. 120, 1947.
Local Public Employees Law, Law No. 261, 1950.
NPA Rule 14-7, 1949.
Id. 6.
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or participating in signature campaigns; planning, organizing, or leading a
parade or a demonstration, or assisting therein; expressing political opinions
publicly by loudspeaker, radio, or any other means; publishing, circulating, or
distributing literature and drawings, or posting them on a public bulletin
board or on other public facilities; and making or distributing flags, stickers,
or badges that show a certain political contention, or displaying, putting up,
or wearing them during office hours.
These regulations are applicable to all public employees, even during offduty hours. Consequently, public employees are banned under Rule 14-7
from almost all political activity except for exercising their right to vote.
Local public employees are subject to similar regulations under the LPEL.
However, the scope of political acts prohibited under the LPEL is narrower
than under the NPEL and NPA Rule 14-7. In addition, the LPEL provides no
criminal punishment for violation of its provisions; only administrative
sanctions are imposed. 5 In any case, public employees are placed under
extensive restrictions on their political activities-restrictions to which an
ordinary citizen is never subject because of the constitutional guarantee.
The current regulative measures were first introduced in 1947 in
accordance with the strong suggestions by the General Headquarters of the
Allied Powers ("GHQ"), without sufficient deliberation by the Diet. At the
time, the GHQ was anxious about the increase in antigovernment political
activities by public employees. Furthermore, it is obvious that the codification
of these measures into public employee laws after 1952 was based on the
Hatch Act of 1940 and the Rules of the United States Federal Personnel
Commission. However, there are apparent differences between the NPEL and
NPA Rule 14-7 and their equivalents in the United States. In the United
States, only the abuse of authority and position is prohibited, and government
employees are not restrained from expressing their own opinions as to any
political affairs or candidates. Needless to say, there is no regulation on
displaying or wearing political drawings, stickers, or badges in the United
States. On the other hand, in Japan there are many restrictions, accompanied
by criminal punishment.
2. Justificationfor Restrictions on Political Activities by Public Employees. Article
15, paragraph 2, of the Constitution rationalizes the wide range of restrictions
on political activities by public employees. It provides that all public officials
and employees are "servants of the whole community." Thus, early court
decisions and legal theories tended to regard the restrictions as not infringing
on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of political activities for public
employees because these restrictions were necessary for "the public welfare"
and "the public interest." 6

5. LPEL, art. 36.
6. See, e.g., 1 H6GAKU KV6KAi, CHOKAI NIHONKOKU KENPO 365-67 (1953). See also 12 KeishfO 942
(Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 16, 1958); 12 Keishfi 501 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 12, 1958).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 2

However, the concept of "servants of the whole community" is too
inclusive and abstract to justify the restrictions on freedom of political
activities. Because they relate to a preferred freedom, the restrictions should
be kept to a strict minimum, and determining the minimum necessary
restriction requires a close, ad hoc analysis of the circumstances surrounding
each case. This approach is incompatible with one that treats all public
officials and employees equally. Thus, today, the concept of "servants of the
whole community" should be considered as an ideal for the execution of
duties by public officials and employees whose positions are based on the
people's will, not as a reason to justify the restrictions on public employees'
7
political rights.
In the Sarufutsu case,8 these restrictions faced a serious constitutional
challenge for the first time. In this case, a postal worker in the village of
Sarufutsu, Hokkaido, was indicted for violating Article 102 of the NPEL and
Rule 14-7 of the NPA. In the 1967 election to the House of Representatives,
the postal worker put several election campaign posters for a Socialist
candidate up on a bulletin board during off-duty hours and distributed the
same posters to some friends, asking them to display the posters in public. In
1968, the Asahikawa District Court acquitted the defendant, holding that the
provisions of the NPEL as applied to the defendant's activities violated the
right to free expression protected by Article 21 of the Constitution and the
right to due process of law as provided by Article 31. The court concluded
that the restrictions in question exceeded the constitutionally permissible
limit by imposing criminal punishment for legitimate union activities, since
the degree of restrictions on freedom of political activities, even by public
employees, should be the minimum necessary due to its importance in a
democratic society. The court stated, "If there are any narrower sanctions
than those provided in the law, and it is possible to attain the same legislative
purpose equally by them, the broad sanction provided in the law is considered
to be unconstitutional as an excessive measure beyond the minimum
necessity." This decision is regarded as an application of the less restrictive
alternative test.' 0 The Sapporo High Court affirmed the district court in 1969
on the same reasoning.
Around the same time, the Tokushima District Court and the Aomori
District Court, in similar cases, held that the restrictions provided by the
2
NPEL and NPA Rule 14-7 violated Articles 21 and 31 of the Constitution.'
The Takamatsu High Court affirmed the former district court decision,
7. See, e.g., K. SATO, KENP6 302 (1981); Ashibe, Komuin tojinken, in 1 SHINPAN KENP6 ENSHU 173
(S. Kiyomiya, I. Sato, T. Abe & Y. Sugihara eds. 1980).
8. Japan v. Osawa (The Sarufutsu Case), 28 Keishfi 393 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 6, 1974) (rev g 514
HanreiJih6 20 (Asahikawa Dist. Ct., Mar. 25, 1968) and 560 HanreiJih6 30 (Sapporo H. Ct.,June 24,

1969)).
9.
10.
11.
12.

514 HanreiJih6 at 24.
N. ASHIBE, GENDAIJINKENRON 267-68, 273 (1974).
560 HanreiJih6 at 31.
611 HanreiJih6 99 (Aomori Dist. Ct., Mar. 30, 1970); 560 HanreiJih6 33 (Tokushima Dist.

Ct., Mar. 27, 1969).
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emphasizing a public employee's right to political expression as a citizen.' 3 In
1971, the Tokyo District Court decided the Zentei placard case in favor of the
plaintiff. 14 In this case, a postal employee had participated in a May Day
demonstration carrying a banner that read: "Overthrow the Sato
Administration which supports the Vietnam War." The May Day was a
Sunday, and the employee was off duty. He successfully contended that the
administrative disciplinary action against him was invalid because it violated
his right of free expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The court stated
that a restriction on political freedom should be the minimum necessary to
maintain administrative neutrality and "the standard of constitutionality is
that there is no less restrictive alternative."1 5 The Tokyo High Court affirmed
the decision in 1973.16 In the Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office
case, four women employees were found guilty and fined ten thousand yen
each for handing out copies of a leaflet listing names of candidates for the
1965 election to the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly.' 7 The Tokyo High Court
reversed the convictions, however, stating that the employees' activities were
normal union activities without substantial illegality.',
In 1974, the Sarufutsu case came before the Supreme Court. The Court
reversed the Asahikawa District Court's finding of unconstitutionality,
upholding the broad, extensive, and uniform restrictions on the freedom of
political activities of public employees under the NPEL and NPA Rule 14-7.
The Court emphasized that public employees were "servants of the whole
community,"' 9 and found the common interest in maintaining the political
neutrality of these servants sufficient to support the broad restrictions:
In order to maintain administrative neutrality and public trust in administration,
imposing a prohibition upon public employees' political activities which are likely to
impede political neutrality is a measure to protect common interests of the whole
people, and its purpose is justifiable ....
[E]ven if the prohibition does not consider
the distinctions in a public employee's position and authority, between working hours
and off-duty hours, and in using public facilities or not, and if it is not limited to the
extent that the activities impede the neutral execution of administration directly and
concretely,° it does not lose the reasonable relation between the prohibition and its
2
purpose.

The Court went on to state that the restrictions on political activities by public
employees were not aimed at the expression of opinion itself; rather, they
were aimed at preventing the harm that the activities were expected to
cause. 2 1 According to the Court, the restrictions were "indirect and
subordinate, ' 22 and, therefore, the test used in the judicial review of this case
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

646 HanreiJih6 95 (Takamatsu H. Ct., May 10, 1971).
22 Gy6shfi 1755 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Nov. 1, 1971).
22 Gy6shfi at 1772.
24 Gy6shfi 1018 (Tokyo H. Ct., Sept. 19, 1973).
566 HanreiJih6 3 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,June 14, 1969).
665 HanreiJih6 29 (Tokyo H. Ct., Apr. 5, 1972).
28 Keisha 393.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 401.

22.

Id.
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could be looser than that usually applied to restraints upon freedom of
expression or political freedom.
Four justices filed a dissenting opinion, stating that the provisions of the
NPEL and NPA Rule 14-7 were invalid because they violated, among others,
Articles 21, 31, and 41 of the Constitution. The dissenters would have upheld
the lower court decision and said that "as to the prohibition with criminal
punishment, the restrictions on the freedom of political expression by public
employees [under Rule 14-7, paragraph 6] are excessively broad and
unconstitutional."

23

On the same day, the Supreme Court overturned the Takamatsu High
Court decision in the Tokushima Post Office case. 2 4 Later, in 1980, the Court
also overturned the Tokyo High Court decision in the Zentei placard case,
upholding the administrative disciplinary action for political activities.25
3. An Appraisal of Restrictions on PoliticalActivities by Public Employees. Despite
the Supreme Court decisions, many scholars have questioned the
constitutionality of the restrictions under the NPEL and NPA Rule 14-7 for
several reasons. First, the restrictions are excessively broad in violation of
Article 21 of the Constitution, since the outright restrictions on political
activities of all public officials and employees reach activities protected by the
Constitution. 2 6 Second, the sanction for the violation exceeds the limit that is
the minimum necessary to attain the legislative purpose. 27 In this respect, the
restrictions are suspected to be unconstitutional under Article 31, which
provides that any criminal penalty shall not be imposed "except according to
procedure established by [due process of] law." Third, NPA Rule 14-7 goes
beyond the constitutionally permissible limits established by Articles 31, 41,
and 73. Article 41 provides that the Diet shall be "the sole lawmaking organ
of the state," and Article 73 provides that cabinet orders cannot include penal
provisions unless authorized by law. Article 102 of the NPEL, however,
delegates the determination of the extent of criminal punishment to the NPA,
an agency of the executive branch of government. This delegation of power,
it is argued, violates the provisions of the Constitution listed above, which
require that the discipline of public officials and employees be based on a
28
statutory standard.
The Constitution presupposes the existence of public officials and
employees, so it admits a special legal relationship between them and the
national and local governments. Maintenance of an efficient public service
system is a legitimate public interest, and, in order to fulfill that interest, it is
constitutionally acceptable to impose minimal restrictions upon the rights and
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 420.
28 Keishu 694 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 6, 1974).
34 Minshfi 959 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 23, 1980).
N. ASHIBE, KENP6SOSH6 NO GENDAITEKI TENKAI 197, 237 (1981). See also dissenting opinion

by four justices in the Sarufutsu case, 28 Keishfi at 419-20.
27. M. ITO, KENP6 208 (1982).
28. R. ARIKURA, KENP6 NI OKERU HANREI NO IGI 364-68 (1979).
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freedoms of public officials and employees. However, the restrictions are
exceptions to the general rights and freedoms of Japanese citizens and apply
only to public employees and officials. Whether there is any compelling
reason to justify such restrictions, and whether they are within the limit of
minimum necessity, must be closely examined. Especially when rights that are
crucial to democracy such as political freedom are involved, close and
accurate analysis is required.
From the point of view just described, it seems in the Sarufutsu case that
the approach of the lower courts and the dissenting justices is far more
appropriate than that of the Supreme Court's majority opinion. There is
serious doubt about the Court's approach in upholding outright restraints on
all public employees without considering relevant factors such as the
employee's position and authority and whether the alleged activities were
done during off-duty hours. In conclusion, it is my opinion that there is doubt
about the constitutionality of the existing restrictions under Article 102 of the
NPEL and NPA Rule 14-7, because restrictions prevent public employees
from exercising their political rights, even during off-duty hours, and forbid
them to engage in almost all activities relating to politics and government.
B.

Restrictions on Election Campaigns under the Public Officials Election
Act

1. Structure of Regulation under the Public Officials Election Act. The preamble to
the Constitution states: "We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly
elected representatives in the National Diet. . .

."

Article 15 provides that the

right to choose and dismiss public officials is an "inalienable right" of the
people. Thus, it is quite obvious that the election, as a procedure to choose
representatives or public officials, has an extremely important position under
the Constitution. Success in democracy depends upon whether the electoral
process is based upon the freely expressed will of the people. Consequently,
the freedom of political campaigns must be adequately protected during the
electoral process. However, the current Public Officials Election Act
("POEL") 29 imposes extensive restrictions on election campaigns, and there
are serious questions about whether these restrictions are compatible with the
principles of democracy.
Restrictions on election campaigns under the POEL consist of the
following:
1. Election campaigns by candidates are permitted only during the
election period. Election campaigns before the notice of
' 30
candidacy are prohibited as "pre-election campaigning."
2. Door-to-door canvassing for votes is forbidden. "No one shall
conduct a door-to-door canvass with the intention of soliciting a
29.
30.

Public Officials Election Act, Law No. 100, 1950.
Id. art. 129.
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vote for oneself or another person or to prevent the voter from
31
voting for another person."
Signature campaigns are prohibited. "No one shall conduct a
signature campaign with the intention of soliciting a vote for
oneself or another person, or to prevent the voter from voting
32
for another person."
Repeated calling activities are banned. "No one shall conduct
33
repeated calling activities for an election campaign."
Each candidate may have only one campaign office, one
34
campaign car, and one campaign loudspeaker.
Written campaign materials are prohibited except as expressly
allowed by law. The number and size of campaign posters and
handbills are strictly limited by the law, as is the number of
campaign postcards. Also, putting up posters is limited to
official poster boards within election districts where posters of all
35
candidates are displayed.
Reports and comments by newspapers and magazines are
banned unless the following requirements are met: (a)
newspapers must be published more than three times a month,
and magazines must be published more than once a month, with
running numbers and with charge;3 6 (b) the newspaper or
magazine must have a third class mail license; (c) the newspaper
or magazine must have been continually published for one year
(six months for daily newspapers) in advance of the election,
during which time it must have met the requirements contained
37
in (a) and (b).

8. Candidates may not use the mass media except as allowed by
law. They can, however, use newspaper advertisements and
television and radio time in predetermined amounts. The
38
government funds such advertisements.
9. Candidates may hold private speech meetings at public facilities
without charge. However, the time available for such meetings is
limited; a candidate may hold only one meeting in a given facility
and notice to the Election Administration Commission is
required in advance. Any other speech meetings are not
39
allowed.
31. Id. art. 138,
1.
32. Id. art. 138(2).
33. Id. art. 140(2).
34. Id. arts. 131, 141.
35. Id. arts. 142, 143, 144, 144(2).
36. The words "with running number and with charge" mean that the issues must be numbered
and that a price must be charged for each issue.
37. Id. art. 148.
38. Id. arts. 149-51.
39. Id. arts. 161-64.
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10. Sidewalk speeches for election campaigns may not be made
40
between the hours of 8 p.m. and 8 a.m. the next morning.
11. Various kinds of political activities by political parties and other
groups in the election are also strictly limited. These activities
include holding political speech meetings and sidewalk speeches,
putting up political posters and notice boards, distributing
handbills, using cars and loudspeakers for political propaganda,
and circulating or distributing free publications such as special
or extra issues.

4

1

These extensive restrictions on election campaigns are extraordinary
among modern democratic states. The restrictions in Japan originated with
the enactment of the Universal Suffrage Law in 1925. The law established
universal male suffrage without property requirements for the first time in
Japan, but at the same time introduced a variety of restrictions on election
campaigns. These restrictions included prohibition of door-to-door
canvassing and extensive regulations on campaign speeches and written
materials. It was explained that the restrictions were necessary to maintain
the decency of candidates and to prevent injustices such as bribery. 4 2 In fact,
these restrictions were aimed at preventing the political influence of the
unpropertied public, who did not have enough money to carry on election
campaigns .43
After World War II, when the current democratic Constitution was
adopted and the election laws were revised, an overall reexamination of
campaign restrictions was supposedly required. In those days, however, most
people, especially Diet members, did not understand the meaning of free
election campaigns, since they were not familiar with democratic
government. 4 4 The POEL, enacted in 1950, partially lifted the ban on doorto-door canvassing, but a 1952 amendment revived most prewar restrictions.
The POEL's basic structure has remained intact to this date. Since the mid1970s, various additional regulations on speech and written materials have
been introduced. The rationale of these regulations, however, is doubtful
because they seem to be part of a partisan strategy of the ruling party to
hinder the election of reformist local governments supported by opposition
parties.
2. Restrictions on Election Campaigns and the Judiciary. The restrictions on
election campaigns, especially on door-to-door canvassing and on speech and
40.
41.

Id. art. 164(6).
Id. art. 201.

42. NAIMUSH6, SHOGIINGIIN SENKYOHO KAISEI RIYUSHO 206 (1925), cited in Okudaira, Genron no
Jiyu to Shihoshinsa, 4 UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, KIHONTEKI JINKEN 284
(1968).
43. See 2 Y.

OKUDAIRA, DoJIDAI ENO HATSUGEN 287-88 (1979) (testimony before the Isumo Br.,
Matsue Dist. Court, Sept. 21, 1977, see infra note 55); Okudaira, Kobetsuhomon to Genron noJiyu, Asahi

Shinbun, evening ed., Aug. 2, 1968.
44. See Soma, Senkyoseido no Kaikaku, in 3
SENGO KAIKAKU 115 (1974).

UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,
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written materials, are excessively regulatory and irrational. Many scholars and
lower court decisions have considered them to be unconstitutional. 4 5 Many
cases challenging such restrictions have come before the Supreme Court;
however, since 1950, the Court has consistently held them to be
constitutional. In that year, the Court upheld the ban on door-to-door
canvassing for the first time, saying that it was not unconstitutional even if
"the measure of insuring fair elections by banning door-to-door canvassing
may result in a certain degree of restriction of freedom of speech [because
canvassing] is accompanied by a variety of harm." 46 The Court did not
47
consider what kind of harm canvassing would cause.
In 1968, the second Petty Bench of the Court pointed out the harm
canvassing creates. 48 First, door-to-door canvassing raises the possibility of
injustice, such as bribery or threats. Second, it creates the opportunity for
other harassment or unfair influence on the voter. Third, door-to-door
canvassing causes excessive competition among candidates. These reasons
have been the ones most commonly given by the Court in decisions on the
ban on canvassing. However, the facts in most cases that came to the courts
made it clear that, while the accused persons had solicited votes, they had not
committed any of these injustices. As a result, there was no perceptible harm
and it was the mere "possibility" of harm that was asserted in door-to-door
canvassing cases. Nevertheless, the reasons have been repeated by the Court
49
without serious reexamination.
50
OnJune 15, 1981, the Court again upheld the prohibition on canvassing.
The Court reasoned that the prohibition of door-to-door visits was not
intended to restrict the expression of ideas and opinions, but to prevent the
harm brought by improper means and methods of expression. In addition,
the Court reasoned that the ban on canvassing was an indirect or a
subordinate restriction on expression resulting from a prohibition of means
and methods, and that the benefits from insuring free and fair elections
gained by the prohibition far outweighed the loss from restricting freedom of
expression. Finally, the Court decided that the determination of whether
door-to-door canvassing should be banned entirely was a matter of legislative
policy. Therefore, Article 138 of the POEL was not beyond the reasonable
and necessary limit and did not violate Article 21 of the Constitution.
Despite these decisions by the Court, the causal nexus between door-todoor canvassing and the asserted harm has yet to be established adequately.
Not only have scholars severely criticized the ban on canvassing, but several
45.

Okudaira, supra note 42, at 267. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56. For other cases

that overturned the ban on door-to-door canvassing, see 944 Hanrei Jih6 133 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct.,
Yanagawa Br., Sept. 7, 1979); 962 Hanrei Jih6 130 (Morioka Dist. Ct., Tono Br., Mar. 25, 1975).
46. 4 KeishQi 1799, 1802 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sept. 27, 1950).
47. Okudaira, supra note 42, at 264-65.
48. 22 Keishu 1319 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B., Nov. 1, 1968).
49. For other Supreme Court decisions upholding the ban on canvassing, see 964 Hanrei Jib6
129 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,June 6, 1980); 933 HanreiJih6 147 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,July 5, 1979); 23 Keishfi 235
(Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 23, 1969); 21 KeishO 1245 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 21, 1967).
50. 35 Keishfi 205 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 15, 1981).
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Supreme Court Justices have also offered opinions that are critical of the ban.
In his supplementary opinion to the third Petty Bench decision on July 21,
1981, Justice Masami Ito stated that the reasons supporting the
constitutionality of the ban on door-to-door canvassing were "not persuasive
enough." 5 1 Although the lower court decisions have been divided on the
issue, 52 not a few of them have found the ban to be invalid as a violation of
Article 21 of the Constitution. For example, in 1968, the Myoji Summary
Court in Wakayama stated that "it is not permissible to prohibit door-to-door
canvassing entirely because the restriction lacks the 'clearness' requirement of
danger."5 3 In 1969, the Saku branch of the Nagano District Court pointed
out that door-to-door canvassing provided an opportunity for a candidate to
criticize an opponent in a direct conversation between the candidate and a
voter and thus "has a great advantage not to be substituted by other election
54
campaign techniques which are likely to end in one-way communication.Furthermore, in 1979, the Isumo branch of the Matsue District Court stated
that "the ban on door-to-door canvassing exceed[ed] the limit of reasonable
and necessary minimum." 5 5 These decisions examined the asserted harm in
detail and concluded that there existed no direct causal nexus between doorto-door canvassing and the asserted harm. The 1980 decision by the Matsue
branch of the Hiroshima High Court 5 6 was the first on the high court level to
invalidate the ban on door-to-door canvassing, but it was overturned by the
Supreme Court in June 1981.5 7 In the decision, the high court, like other

lower courts, examined the allegations that door-to-door canvassing was
harmful to candidates' decency, extremely troublesome for candidates,
disadvantageous to incumbents, and led to emotional influences on the
elections. The high court found that the reasons offered for prohibiting
canvassing do not justify the suppression of freedom of expression. The
possibility of injustice, such as bribery, is very abstract, and voter harassment
can be eliminated easily by other means. 58 The high court concluded that the
total ban on door-to-door canvassing was not a reasonable and necessary
restriction permissible under the Constitution. 59 To say the least, these
rulings by the lower courts rest upon far more persuasive reasoning than
those of the Supreme Court.
As for regulations on the use of written election materials, the Supreme
Court also has consistently found these regulations to be constitutional,
stating that they were reasonable and necessary to maintain "the public
51. 35 Keishfi 568, 577 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., July 21, 1982) (Ito, J., supp. op.).
52. For examples upheld by the lower courts, see 915 HanreiJih6 124 (Tokyo H. Ct., May 30,
1978); 21 Kokeishfi 582 (Tokyo H. Ct., Nov. 27, 1968); 538 Hanrei Jih6 87 (Osaka H. Ct., Sept. 25,
1968); 505 Hanrei Jih6 77 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Iwamisawa Br., Oct. 24, 1967).
53. 512 HanreiJih6 76, 77 (Myoji Summ. Ct., Mar. 12, 1968).
54. 234 HanreiJih6 32, 33 (Nagano Dist. Ct., Saku Br., Apr. 18, 1969).
55. 923 HanreiJih6 141, 146 (Matsue Dist. Ct., Isumo Br., Jan. 24, 1979).
56. 964 HanreiJih6 134 (Hiroshima H. Ct., Matsue Br., Apr. 24, 1980).
57. 35 Keishu 205.
58. 964 HanreiJih6 at 136-38.
59. Id. at 138.
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welfare" by preserving the freedom and fairness of elections. 60 However,
written materials are not only a means of communicating ideas and opinions;
they are an essential means of communication in election campaigns and
political activities. Thus, to impose substantial restrictions on written
materials during the election process is to neglect political freedom.
Especially during the election process, political freedom should be strongly
protected.
What kinds of harms would be caused by leaving written political materials
unfettered in the election period? As an example, there was a case in which a
publisher of a small-town newspaper was indicted for violating Article 148 of
the POEL. He printed comments about the ongoing election in his paper
although, unfortunately, his newspaper did not comply with the "three times a
month" publication requirement of Article 148. Some scholars say that these
requirements are unconstitutional under Article 21.61 However, the Supreme
Court upheld the requirements in 1979, stating that the provision in question
was not applied to "all reports and comments relating to elections, but ones
which are likely to have effects of advantage or disadvantage on the poll of the
particular candidate." 6 2 Despite the Supreme Court decision, there still
remains considerable ambiguity in some respects. The Court seems to
approve the punishment if there is only a possibility of harm. More basically,
it is not certain that the "three times a month" requirement is needed in order
to insure a fair election; nor is it certain how the requirement sufficiently
justifies its restriction upon freedom of expression. The three requirements
of Article 148 of the POEL on reports and comments seem to prevent people
who do not have effective access to the media from expressing their own
opinions about elections.
3. Restrictions on Election Campaigns and Democracy. Under the Constitutional
principle of democratic government, the election is the most important
opportunity for the people to participate directly in governmental affairs. The
very foundation of democracy is that the people are allowed to express their
own opinions sufficiently during the election process-that is, during free
election campaigns. Of course, the election must be fair, but, at the same
time, it must be free. During the election process, the people should be given
enough information to judge and choose the direction of governmental affairs
and should be offered sufficient opportunities to express themselves, to hear
others, and to discuss public affairs. Without a sufficient guarantee of the
people's rights to expression, information, and discussion, the constitutional
principle of the people's sovereignty would become one in name only.
The extensive regulations under the POEL restrict the candidates'
campaigns and, as a result, narrow the opportunities for the people to know
60. See, e.g., 23 Keishu 235; 18 Keish6i 561 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 18, 1964); 9 Keish& 635 (Sup. Ct.,
Mar. 30, 1955); 4 Keishfi 1799; 4 Keish6i 819 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 6, 1950).
61. See, e.g., N. ASHIBE, ENSHO KENP6 109 (1982); K. SATO, CHIDSHAKU NIHONKOKU KENP6 490
(1984).
62. 952 HanreiJiho 17, 18 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1979).
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the issues of elections, the opinions of candidates, and the policies of political
parties. The POEL also entirely excludes the people from participating in
electoral campaigns. It exclusively regulates the relationship between
candidates and the state. The law regards the sovereign people as a third
party, as mere objects of a candidate's campaign. The restrictive measures of
the POEL, such as the total ban on door-to-door canvassing and the extensive
regulations on written materials, are excessively suppressive, harming
particularly those people who are willing to express themselves actively or to
participate in election campaigns for candidates on their own initiative.
Once the constitutional principles of democratic government and the
people's sovereignty are recognized, then an election law should be enacted
on the basis of those principles. The extensive restrictions under the current
POEL must be thoroughly examined in light of the principles mentioned
above.
C.

Restrictions on Political Campaigns under the Subversive Activities
Prevention Law

1. The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952. The Subversive Activities
Prevention Law ("SAPL") 6 3 was enacted in 1952, soon after the termination
of the Occupation and the effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
The law established regulatory and punitive measures against organizations
that engaged in organized, violent subversive activities. The purpose of the
SAPL was "the preservation of the public safety." 64 In the early 1950s, as the
Cold War between the West and the East escalated, Japan could not avoid
becoming involved in the political and social tensions of the era. Thus, when
the Peace Treaty came into effect, the SAPL was enacted as a substitute for the
occupation laws. Its direct predecessor was a Cabinet Order of 1949 relating
to the regulation of organizations. 65 This order succeeded the Imperial
Ordinance of February 1946, which was aimed at the activities of nationalistic
and militaristic organizations. The Cabinet Order expanded its regulations to
left wing organizations and required such organizations to report the names
of their members.
As soon as it was proposed, the SAPL met with strong opposition because
it reminded the people of their past experience under the Peace Preservation
Law of 1925, which provided for capital punishment of those who organized
or knowingly participated in an association whose purpose was to change the
basic structure of the nation, the kokutai, or to repudiate the private property
system. 6 6 While the SAPL, like the Peace Preservation Law, was a thought
control act, 6 7 its regulatory methods and procedures were directly modeled
63. Subversive Activities Prevention Law, Law No. 240, 1952 [hereinafter SAPL]. For
comprehensive studies on the law, see H. OTSUKA, TOKUBETSU KEIH-6 (1959); BESSATSu H6RITSU
J IH6: HAKAIKATSUD6 B6SHIH6 (1952) [hereinafter BESSATSu HORITSUJIHo].
64. SAPLsupra note 63, art. 1.
65. Organizations Control Ordinance, Cabinet Order No. 64, 1949.
66. Watanabe, Seijiteki Hyogen nofiyu Hoi no Keisei, 33 SHAKAIKAGAKu KENKYu 265, 290 (1981).
67. Id. at 295.
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on the Smith Act of 1940 and the McCarran Act of 1951 in the United
States. 68 Although the SAPL did not clearly indicate an intent to control
communism, its aim was, in fact, to counter communism. 69 The opponents of
the bill criticized it as being destructive of the freedoms of speech and
association. In the end, the strong opposition during the Diet deliberation
brought additional provisions to the law. For example, Article 2 provides that
the law "must be applied within the narrowest possible limits necessary for
the preservation of public safety, and it must not be interpreted broadly."
Furthermore, Article 3 forbids abuses of authority and provides that "there
shall not be any undue limitations on freedom of thought, religion, assembly,
association and expression, academic freedom, the rights of workers to
organize and to act collectively, and other freedoms and rights guaranteed by
the Constitution of Japan."
There are two categories of regulations in the SAPL. The first category is
aimed at the organization itself. An organization found engaging in violent
subversive activities shall be banned from demonstrating, meeting, and
publisning or distributing papers for a period not exceeding six months, and,
where necessary, the Public Security Commission shall order dissolution of
the organization. 7 0 The second category focuses on individuals who engage
in such activities. 7 I For example, Article 4 of the SAPL defines "violent
subversive activities" as follows: (1) to engage in activities such as rebellion,
subversion, and other particular crimes prohibited under the Criminal
Code,7 2 or to incite, instigate, prepare, or conspire in such crimes with the
intention to promote, support, or oppose any political doctrine or policy; or
(2) to print, distribute, or post publicly any document or drawing insisting on
the propriety or the necessity of the performance of rebellion, subversion, or
assistance of subversion with the same intention. The SAPL also provides
that it is a criminal act to prepare, conspire in, incite, or instigate the
particular crimes prohibited under the Criminal Code, such as riot or
73
obstruction of the execution of public duties, with the same intention.
The regulation of the organization itself is through administrative prior
restraint and not by criminal punishment. The procedures to pursue the
restraint are initiated with a mere request by the Director of the Public
Security Agency. The Director shall submit a written request stating the cause
of the request to the Public Security Commission. The written request must
be submitted with evidence or proof to establish the asserted fact and
investigatory files produced in compliance with the SAPL.7 4 The SAPL
authorizes the Commission to determine the appropriate administrative
action, including the prohibition of organizational activities for a certain
68. Id. at 291-92.
69. BESSATSU H6RITSUJIHo, supra note 63, at 13.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

SAPL, supra note 63, arts. 5, 7.
Id. art. 38.
Law No. 45, 1907.
SAPL, supra note 63, arts. 39, 40.
Id. arts. 11, 20.
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period or the dissolution of the organization itself.7 5 The decision by the

Commission may ultimately be appealed to the courts, but the procedures do
not necessarily give the organization sufficient ability to defend itself.
The constitutionality of these SAPL provisions is doubtful. In fact, many
scholars have questioned it,76 and, as a result, these provisions regulating an
organization's activities have never been invoked. However, Article 27 grants
extensive investigatory authority to public security investigators, stating that
they "may make . . . necessary investigations in relation to the regulation

under this law." Up to the present, public security investigators have engaged
in extensive investigations into communist organizations by various illegal
means, including wiretapping, and clandestine photographing or videotaping.
Recently, there have been revelations that the police placed wiretaps on an
officer of the Japan Communist Party ("JCP") and that investigators took
clandestine photographs and videotapes of the headquarters of the JCP.
Because the means of enforcement adopted by investigators are illegal and
intrusive to the right of privacy, another constitutional problem with the
SAPL arises.
2. Developments under the Subversive Activities Prevention Law. As mentioned
above, there has been no case involving the regulation of organizations under
the SAPL, probably because these measures are too drastic and too likely to
create a potential conflict with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
assembly and association. Thus, the only cases invoking the SAPL involved
punishment of individuals' activities. Two types of cases have been brought,
the first involving Article 38, paragraph 2, and the second involving Article
40. The former provision says that any person who prints, distributes, or
publicly posts any document or drawing insisting on the propriety or the
necessity of the performance of rebellion, with intention to perform such
crime, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years. The
latter provision says that any person who prepares, conspires, incites, or
instigates the obstruction of the execution of public duties or a riot, with the
intention to promote, support, or oppose any political doctrine or policy shall
be sentenced to up to three years' imprisonment.
There were four cases under Article 38. These cases took place in 1952 in
Kushiro, Tsu, Kyoto, and Gifu. In the Kushiro case, 7 7 two workers were
indicted for distributing an election campaign document that read, "Only
fighting with armament can lead us to a great victory." In 1954, the Kushiro
District Court acquitted the defendants, stating that the document in question
was only propaganda material in the election, and that the document's
content, neither in whole nor in part, insisted upon the propriety or the
necessity of rebellion. According to the Kushiro District Court, application of
75. Id. art. 22.
76. M. Ito, supra note 27, at 290, 293; N. KOBAYASHI,
Watanabe, supra note 66, at 304-06.
77. 36 HanreiJih6 3 (Kushiro Dist. Ct., Sept. 15, 1954).

SHINPAN KENP6 KOGI

446-47 (1980);
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this provision of the SAPL should be limited only to instances in which the
speech caused a clear and imminent danger that brought great harm to public
safety. In 1956 the Sapporo High Court affirmed. 78 In these decisions,
however, the provision itself was not declared to be unconstitutional on its
face.
In three other cases, 79 affiliates of the JCP were indicted for distributing
documents that read, "We have to start preparing for armament." In these
cases, the courts found that the documents insisted upon the propriety or the
necessity of rebellion. At the same time, the courts did not find that the
defendants had any intention to perform rebellion. Consequently, they were
acquitted. According to the courts, in order to find an intention of rebellion,
there must be knowledge of the content of the document, an intention to
perform rebellion, and a probability of actual rebellion. "When there is no
clear and imminent danger which causes the harm, to restrict and punish the
speech on an estimated future harm is contrary to the basic principle of
democracy." 80 But once again, Article 38, paragraph 2, was not invalidated
on its face. The references to "clear and imminent danger" in those decisions
were remarkable, but the concept was used as one factor for factfinding, not
as a standard for constitutional review. These cases were affirmed by the high
courts of Nagoya and Osaka and by the Supreme Court. 8 '
There are two cases under Article 40 of the SAPL. In the first, three
leaders of the Middle Core Faction, a leftist political group, were indicted for
a violation of Article 40. They made speeches in front of many students and
workers at four political meetings held between April 17 and 24, 1969, and
they called upon the students and workers to "occupy the Capitol and seize
the Prime Minister's residence." The meetings were aimed at Okinawa Day
on April 28, and were to demonstrate opposition to government policy on
Okinawa. The leaders were accused of inciting a riot and obstruction of
execution of public duties. In 1985, the Tokyo District Court declared them
guilty, stating that the SAPL was enacted to proscribe subversive activities
against parliamentary democracy; that the SAPL was aimed at the acts of
incitement or instigation, not at thought itself; and that, therefore, the SAPL
did not violate Article 19 (freedom of thought) or Article 21 of the
Constitution.8 2 The court also said that Article 40 of the SAPL did not
require an actual danger, but an abstract one, and that there was an abstract

78. 74 HanreiJih6 21 (Sapporo H. Ct., Mar. 30, 1956).
79. 183 HanreiJiho 5 (Gifu Dist. Ct.,Jan. 27, 1959); 112 HanreiJih6 I (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Dec.
1956); 48 Hanrei Jih6 3 (Tsu Dist. Ct., Feb. 28, 1955).
80. 48 HanreiJiho, at 15.
81. 496 HanreiJiho 68 (Sup. Ct., July 20, 1967), aff'g 4 Kakeishu 1001 (Nagoya H. Ct., Dec.
1962); 496 HanreiJih6 76 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 22, 1967), aff g 456 HanreiJih6 16 (Osaka H. Ct., Apr.
1966); 396 HanreiJih6 19 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 21, 1964), aff'g 396 HanreiJih6 24 (Nagoya H. Ct.,Jan.
1964).
82. 1146 HanreiJih6 35 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Mar. 4, 1985).

27,

24,
21,
14,
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danger generally in this case. 83 The Tokyo High Court affirmed the
84
conviction and upheld the constitutionality of the provision.
The second case was much like the first. A leader of the Middle Core
Faction, who had given a radical speech at a political meeting, was indicted for
violating Article 40 of the SAPL. The Tokyo District Court declared him
guilty. 8 5 According to the court, the provision did not violate Article 21 of the
Constitution because it did not punish the actual content of the expression;
rather, it punished conduct considered to be socially dangerous. The Tokyo
High Court affirmed this decision in 1988.86 The high court said that the
action of incitement was dangerous by itself; therefore, punishment of such
action did not violate Article 21 of the Constitution.
In these two cases, there were lag periods between the speeches and the
asserted riots-the longest being eleven days. However, the police had done
nothing to avoid the riots during these lag periods. The courts seem to have
disregarded too easily the degree of imminence of danger.8 7 Nonetheless, on
September 28, 1990, the second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court affirmed
these two high court decisions, stating that the provision in question, Article
40 of the SAPL, did not violate Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution because
it did not aim at thought or speech itself, but at an act of incitement. 88
In addition to the cases mentioned above, there were two other SAPL
cases. In the Sammu case, twelve members of an anticommunist group were
accused of planning a coup d'etat, acquiring weapons and bullets, and
undergoing training to use the weapons. They were indicted for preparation
for murder and riot in violation of Articles 39 and 40 of the SAPL. The Tokyo
District Court declared them guilty in 1964,89 and the Tokyo High Court
affirmed that decision in 1967.90 In 1970, the Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal, stating that Articles 39 and 40 did not violate the guarantee of due
process under Article 31 of the Constitution. 9' In the Sekigun case, members
of an extreme leftist group who engaged in training for an attack on the Prime
92
Minister's residence were convicted under Articles 39 and 40 of the SAPL.
3. An Appraisal of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law. One commentator
remarked that "there was no truth at all that freedom of speech, expression,
assembly, and thought was deprived or restricted" by enactment of the SAPL;
"rather, violent subversive activities disappeared by the enactment of the law,
83.

Id. at 41.

84.
85.
86.

1232 HanreiJih6 43 (Tokyo H. Ct., Mar. 16, 1987).
17 Keisai Geppo 957 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Oct. 16, 1985).
1308 HanreiJih6 157 (Tokyo H. Ct., Oct. 12, 1988).
87. Y. OKUDAIRA, NAZE HY6GEN NOJIY0 KA 70 n.63 (1988); Ebashi, Seijiteki
Ki 1oHydgen noJiyzi no
Taiyj, 64 HAB6H6 KENKYfJ 18, 23-24 (1989); Okudaira, Zohu Genron Hanzai Kd,H6GAKU SEMINAR,Jan.

1985, at 8, 11.
88.

Unpublished Sup. Ct. decision, Sept. 28, 1990.

89. 6 Kakeish6i 694 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 30, 1964).
90. 492 HanreiJih6 20 (Tokyo H. Ct., June 5, 1967).
91.
92.

1980).

24 Keish6i 412 (Sup. Ct., July 2, 1970).
1088 HanreiJih6 3 (Tokyo H. Ct.,July 27, 1983); 989 HanreiJih6 8 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,Jan 30,
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and the law has adequately achieved its purpose 'to contribute to maintenance
of public security.'
However, this kind of appraisal does not seem to be
justifiable. The SAPL is a typical sedition law aimed at controlling assembly,
association, speech, press, and thought.
There have been many questions posed about the constitutionality of the
SAPL since its enactment in 1952. Consequently, as noted above, the
provisions for regulating organizations have never been invoked. The courts
have not approved the constitutionality of provisions punishing the
distribution of documents advocating the propriety and necessity of rebellion.
Instead, they have found that most cases lacked clear and imminent danger.
However, punishment for speeches at political meetings was upheld by the
courts because of general dangers that caused harm to public security. In
those cases, however, the courts did not require the existence of actual danger
in order to punish incitement. Therefore, it is doubtful whether punishing a
person for delivering a speech when there is no clear and imminent danger is
compatible with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Some
scholars believe that the punishment of speech should be limited to cases
where there is a clear and imminent probability of danger that results in actual
94
harm.
",93

D.

Restrictions on Demonstrations under the Public Safety Ordinances

1.
Outline of the Restrictions of the Public Safety Ordinances. Many restrictions
on political campaigns and activities in public forums arise from various laws
and local public entities' ordinances, such as restrictions on demonstrations
under public safety ordinances, restrictions on sidewalk speeches under the
Road Traffic Law, 9 5 restrictions on handbill activities under the Misdemeanor
Law9 6 or the outdoor advertisement laws, 9 7 and restrictions on the use of
loudspeakers in certain areas, including around the Diet, under the Quiet
Preservation Law. 9 8 It has been asserted that these restrictions are necessary
to preserve regional peace, traffic order, city scenery, property rights, and low
noise levels. 99 However, whether all of these restrictions can be supported by
93. Fujinaga, Hakaikatsud6Bdshihd,in 8 HANREI KEIH6 KENKYfj 319 (H. Nishihara, K. Miyazawa,
J. Abe, H. Itakura, M. Otahi & K. Shibahara eds. 1981).
94. See, e.g., Shimizu, Hakaikatsudo Boshiho no Sendozai no Gokensei, in 1985 JURIST JyfOv6 HANREI
KAISETSU

20, 21 (1986).

95. Road Traffic Law, Law No. 105, 1960 (restrictions on the use of streets).
96. Misdemeanor Law, Law No. 39, 1948 (restrictions on handbill activities).
97. Outdoor Advertisement Law, Law No. 189, 1949 (restrictions on outdoor advertisement).
Most local public entities have their own outdoor advertisement ordinances.
98. Quiet Preservation Law, Law No. 90, 1988 (regulation of the use of loudspeakers in certain
areas).
99. See, e.g., 41 Keish6i 15 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1987) (regulation of posters under the Oita outdoor
advertisement ordinance); 36 Keishfi 908 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 16, 1982) (permission by a chief of police
required by Road Traffic Law to use street for demonstration); 24 Keishfi 280 (Sup. Ct., June 17,
1970) (restriction on handbill activities under the Misdemeanor Law); 22 Keishu 1549 (Sup. Ct., Dec.
18, 1968) (restriction on outdoor advertisement under the Outdoor Advertisement Law and the
Osaka outdoor advertisement ordinance); 14 Keishii 253 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 3, 1960) (permission for
sidewalk speech under the Road Traffic Law). For regulation of the use of loudspeakers in certain
areas, see Usaki, Genron to Souon no aida, 61 H6RITSUJI-6, No. 8, 56 (1989).
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the Constitution is doubtful. The restrictions on demonstrations under the
public safety ordinances have been the most controversial.
The public safety ordinances are the ordinances of local public entities
that are designed to preserve regional peace through restrictions on
demonstrations and other collective activities. Before the war, the Peace
Police Law of 1900 authorized the police to restrict or prohibit outdoor
meetings, demonstrations, sidewalk speeches, and other collective activities.
However, the public safety ordinances were substituted for the Peace Police
Law after its abolition in 1945. At present, Tokyo, twenty-four prefectures,
and thirty-five cities have these ordinances.10 0 The enactment of public safety
ordinances began with the Osaka city ordinance of 1948, and reached its peak
in 1949 when Tokyo, twenty prefectures, and nineteen cities enacted their
ordinances.' 0 ' During the same period, small towns and villages also enacted
ordinances, but all of these were repealed in 1954 when the Police Law was
amended. 0 2 The GHQprovided strong influence and guidance in enacting
the ordinances, and its intent was to prepare for the preservation of peace in
Japan in advance of the Korean War.' 0 3 However, the Constitution of Japan
already provided in Article 21 that "[fireedom of assembly and association as
well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No
censorship shall be maintained .

. . ."

Thus, the constitutionality of the public

safety ordinances has been questioned since their enactment.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance of 1950 provides an example of the
structure of restrictions under the public safety ordinances. 0 4 Under Article
1 of this ordinance, any person who intends either to hold a meeting or to
walk in a parade, on a street or in any other public forum, or who intends to
demonstrate regardless of place, shall ask for the permission of the Tokyo
Public Safety Commission. Article 2 requires the individual, or a
representative of the organization, to submit an application for permission
seventy-two hours before the event. Under Article 3, the Commission may
refuse permission or may impose additional conditions on the permit when it
clearly finds that the meeting, parade, or demonstration is likely to cause
direct danger to the preservation of public safety. Under Article 5, if the
meeting, parade or demonstration takes place without prior permission or in
violation of the additional conditions, the person responsible for the meeting,
parade, or demonstration shall be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding

one year or fined in an amount not exceeding fifty thousand yen.
Other ordinances have similar restrictions. Five ordinances substitute
notification systems for the permission system of the Tokyo ordinance, and
two require notification for meetings and permission for parades or
demonstrations. Twenty-four do not regulate the holding of meetings. Forty100.

0.

OZAKI,

K6ANJY6REI

K6ANJY6REI 135-37 (1967).
101. 0. OZAKI, supra note

102.
103.
104.

SEITEI

HISHI

185 (1978).

100, at 188.

Id. at 187.
Id. at 159-84.
Tokyo Metropolitan Ordinance No. 44, July 3, 1950.

See also HORITSU JIH6

RINJIZ6KAN,
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eight ordinances limit the time for notification or for permit applications to
seventy-two hours before the meeting, parade, or demonstration, while eleven
0
set a forty-eight hour time limit and one has a twenty-four hour time limit.'

5

Most ordinances, including the Tokyo ordinance, have some provision to
inhibit administrative abuse. However, in practice, the ordinance restrains or
limits political campaigning and other activities of the people in the same
' 1 7 sedition law.
manner as a so-called "functional"' 1 6 or "curve d"'
Where there is no public safety ordinance, Article 77 of the Road Traffic
Law requires permission from the Chief of Police to hold a parade or
demonstration on the road. The chief may refuse permission or may impose
"necessary conditions" when the parade or demonstration is likely to obstruct
traffic. Thus, the Road Traffic Law quite possibly provides a functional
substitute for public safety ordinances. 0 8
2. Developments under the Public Safety Ordinances. The first important dispute
on the constitutionality of the public safety ordinances happened in Niigata in
1949. In this case, several hundred Koreans demonstrated at the police
station without prior permission, demanding the release of fellow Koreans
who had been arrested on charges of illicit brewing. The leaders of the
demonstration were indicted for violating the Niigata public safety ordinance
and convicted by the lower court. In 1954, the Supreme Court upheld the
convictions and dismissed the appellants' contention that the ordinance
established an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of assembly.' 0 9
However, the Court set three constitutional requirements for upholding the
constitutionality of an ordinance:
(1) placing prior restraints on
demonstrations through a general permission system is impermissible; (2) a
notification system based upon reasonable and clear criteria regarding the
specific place and means of demonstrations is not unconstitutional; and (3)
when clear and imminent danger to public safety is expected, failure to permit
the demonstration does not violate the Constitution. 1 0
As a result, in 1959, when two student leaders of a demonstration against
an amendment to the Police Duties Execution Law were accused of violating
the Tokyo ordinance, the Tokyo District Court acquitted them, relying upon
the Supreme Court decision in the Niigata ordinance case."II The court
stated that the ordinance did not clearly define the criteria for obtaining
105. 0. OZAKI, supra note 100, at 186; HbRITSUJIH6 RINJIZ6KAN, supra note 100, at 135-57.
106. M. KANEKO, Chianrippd-setsukara mira Koanjydrei Gjken Hanketsu, 208 JURIST 57, 61-62 (1960).
Professor Kaneko points out that public safety ordinances necessarily perform the function of
indirectly and subordinately suppressing antigovernment ideologies, and he therefore called the
ordinance "the modern type of sedition law." Id. at 61.
107. R. ARIKURA, supra note 28, at 301-23.
108. See 36 Keishfi 908 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 16, 1982).
109. 8 Keish6 1866 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 1954).
110. Id. at 1872-73.
111.
14 Keishfi 1281 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 8, 1959).
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permission to demonstrate. However, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Tokyo District Court in 1960.112
The Supreme Court deemed the demonstrators to be "potential rioters."
Furthermore, the Court stated that unlike mere speech or use of the press,
expression through collective activities potentially involved support from
physical force, and that this potential force often created excitement that was
likely to turn a demonstration into a riot in a moment. 133 Although there was
a slight reference to the Constitution, the Court made no fair evaluation of
collective activities, such as demonstrations, in light of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression. Despite the prohibition of censorship by
Article 21, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, the Court stated that as far as
freedom of expression through demonstration was concerned, it was
necessary, after considering regional and other circumstances, to take
minimum measures in advance to preserve law and order through a public
safety ordinance by preparing for unexpected incidents. 114 In the end, the
Court concluded:
In short, collective activities regulated by the ordinance, especially demonstrations,
are far outside the scope of freedom of pure expression, which ought to be performed
quietly and orderly, and collective activities contain physical force which is likely to
turn into violence. Thus, it may not be said that a certain degree of regulation of these
activities is unnecessary. The State and society must respect freedom of expression
for the most part, but it is really unavoidable to expect in advance activities which
destroy peace and order under the pretext of the exercise of freedom of expression, or
which are likely to do so, and to take appropriate measures in preparing for any
unexpected incidents. Of course, it will not be said that there is absolutely no risk that
the ordinance may infringe upon the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 21
of the Constitution. It is a matter of course to superintend the Public Safety
Commission, which is responsible for execution of the ordinance so as not to abuse its
authority under the pretext of preservation of public safety, and so as not to suppress
peaceful and orderly collective activities. However, even though the ordinance may be
abused, it is not appropriate to hold that the ordinance is unconstitutional.' 15

Two justices wrote dissenting opinions in the case,' 1 6 and many scholars
criticized the majority opinion of the Court.' 17 In addition, several lower
courts declared public safety ordinances to be unconstitutional, relying on the
Supreme Court decision in the Niigata case. For example, in 1967, the Kyoto
District Court struck down the Kyoto city ordinance as unconstitutional on its
face.' 8 In the same year, the Tokyo District Court declared the Tokyo
ordinance to be unconstitutional as applied in one case,' 19 and it acquitted
defendants by interpreting the ordinance strictly in another case. 120 In 1975,
the Supreme Court once again had an opportunity to review the
112.

14 Keishfi 1243 (Sup. Ct.,July 20, 1960).

113.

Id. at 1248.

114.

Id.

115.

Id. at 1250-51.

116.

Id. at 1251 (Fujita,J. dissenting); id. at 1256 (Tarumi,J., dissenting).
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constitutionality of a public safety ordinance in the Tokushima case.' 2 , In this
case, a leader of an antiwar group was indicted for violation of the city
ordinance that required demonstrators to "preserve traffic order." One of
the issues in this case was whether the ordinance violated the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law under Article 31. Although the Supreme
Court admitted the ordinance lacked "propriety as legislation," it emphasized
that an ordinary person could read the meaning of the provision as applying
only to acts that intentionally obstructed traffic order. The Court declared
that the provision of the ordinance did not lack clarity and therefore was not
unconstitutional.

1

22

Shortly after the Tokushima case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction
in another Tokyo ordinance case, but only on the ground that, while the
demonstration took place peacefully, it took place without official permission
of the Public Safety Commission. 2 3 The decision meant that collective
activities without official permission were illegal in both form and substance,
thus restraining the trend in the lower courts to interpret the ordinances
strictly. In addition, in 1982, the Court upheld a conviction for a
demonstration without permission under the Road Traffic Law. 12 4
3. The Public Safety Ordinances and Freedom of Political Expression. Collective
activities such as parades and demonstrations are included in "all other forms
of expression" in Article 21 of the Constitution. Moreover, collective
activities play an extremely important role in a democratic society. As the
Kyoto District Court decision said,' 2 5 collective activities are the primary
means of expression for people who, due to economic reasons, lack access to
the comparatively more effective mass media, such as publication and
broadcasting. Collective activities supplement the process of representative
government, and they should therefore be evaluated as forms of expression.
However, expression through collective activities is accompanied by

physical limitations. An activity involving a group larger than the forum is
capable of holding is impossible, and several groups cannot use the same
forum at the same time. Thus, some restrictions on collective activities are
needed in order to maintain traffic order, to secure public properties, and to
protect participants. Therefore, regulation of activities under clear criteria for
their time, place, and manner should be acceptable. Needless to say, such
criteria should be content-neutral, not content-based. Any restriction on
collective activities which is content-based must be viewed as a form of
censorship prohibited by the Constitution. Permissible criteria are those that
121. 29 Keishi 489 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 10, 1975).
122. Id. at 503-06.
123. 29 Keishfi 777 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 24, 1975). In the same year the Court upheld convictions
under public safety ordinances in three other cases. See 29 Keishfi 860 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 24, 1975)
(Osaka city ordinance case); 29 Keishu 657 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 26, 1975) (Kanagawa ordinance case); 29
Keishf6 610 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1975) (Aichi ordinance case).
124. 36 Keishfi 908 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 16, 1982).
125. 480 HanreiJih6 7 (Kyoto Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 1967).
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govern only time, place, and manner, regardless of content, and that do not
give any discretion, or any room for abuse, to safety commissions and the
police who execute the ordinances. Any conditions that the safety
commissions may place on collective activities must also be content-neutral,
controlling only the time, place, or manner of such activities. However, if a
commission demands an overall change of time or place before allowing such
activities, it may, in effect, deny permission to go forth with the activities as
originally planned. At present, the restrictions on demonstrations under the
public safety ordinances are far beyond permissible limits and far removed
from the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.
III
CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the Constitution of Japan adopts the principle of
democratic government and guarantees various rights and freedoms
underlying it. However, I have many questions about whether democracy has
actually been realized under this Constitution because of the various and
extensive restrictions on political campaigns and other activities essential to
democracy. Many of these restrictions are beyond the limit necessary to
ensure and preserve democracy.
With regard to the outright prohibition of political activities by public
employees to maintain administrative neutrality under both the NPEL and the
LPEL, there is a suspicion that those prohibitions impermissibly restrain the
constitutionally protected political and civil rights of public employees.
Furthermore, the POEL's various restrictions on election campaigns seem to
prevent the people's participation in governmental affairs, in direct contrast
to the law's goal of ensuring fair elections. Moreover, the SAPL imposes
extensive and unreasonable restrictions on the freedoms of assembly,
association, speech, and press. It is safe to say that the law, in substance, is a
typical sedition law aimed at controlling anti-government ideologies and
activities. Finally, there have been many restrictions on political campaigns
and activities in public forums under the public safety ordinances and other
laws. These restrictions are formally intended to secure legitimate interests
such as property rights, regional peace, traffic order, city scenery, and area
quiet, but, in effect, they function as laws to control anti-government
expression. Therefore, they may be characterized as "functional" or
"curved" sedition laws.
Three factors can be identified as causes for the inadequacy of the present
situation, which is contrary to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of

political activities. First, many of these restrictions originated from the
policies of the GHQ during the military occupation after World War II. The
restrictions on political and civil rights under the Occupation should have
been exceptions to the Constitution, and therefore, repealed at the time of the
Occupation's termination. It was extremely unfortunate for the Constitution
and for democracy in Japan that the enactment of the Constitution and the
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formation of the basic framework of the government after World War II took
place under a military occupation. Second, since both democracy and
democratic government were completely new to the Japanese people, they
were politically immature and unfamiliar with democratic institutions. As a
result, this brought about the long-lived conservative regime in the postwar
period, and both the government and the people tended to lose sensitivity
and tolerance for minorities. Consequently, various restrictions on political
freedom have remained. Third, and most important, it should be pointed out
that the concept that political freedom occupies a preferred position among
protected rights has not matured sufficiently in constitutional theory. Except
for a few legal scholars, the courts, the lawyers, and the people were all
unfamiliar with the system of judicial review which was adopted for the first
time by the 1947 Constitution. Therefore, they have been willing to accept
many restrictions on political freedom from ambiguous and equivocal "public
welfare" concepts, without any close examination of what these concepts
actually entail. As a result, they seem to have neglected to form a sufficient
framework in constitutional theory to deal with political freedom.
Throughout the history of the 1947 Constitution, Japan has accomplished
a rapid economic development but has accumulated many political problems
incompatible with the principles of its Constitution. For the solutions to these
problems, we must look toward the fifth decade of the Constitution.

